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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 981353-CA

vs.
JOHN K. PROVENCE,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant, John K. Provence, appeals his conviction of operating a clandestine drug
laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1996), and
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was trial counsel ineffective by not objecting to a jury instruction that properly
reflected the preliminary hearing court's bindover ruling?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on
appeal, this Court resolves the issue as a matter of law. State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814
(UtahApp. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 3, 1996, defendant John K. Provence was charged by information with
operating a clandestine drug laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1996) (R. 001), and possession of methamphetamine, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1996) (R. 003).
At a preliminary hearing held on November 29, 1996, the State adduced evidence
that defendant possessed certain laboratory equipment and supplies used in the production
of methamphetamine (R. 215:2-11, 18-21). Through the testimony of an investigating
officer, the State showed that defendant kept iodine, scales, and other items used in the
production of methamphetamine in his bedroom (R. 215:15-16,18-19, 23-24). The State
also showed that defendant possessed methamphetamine which was found in his kitchen
(R. 215:9, 11). From the quantity of evidence discovered inside defendant's house that
indicated the operation of a clandestine drug laboratory, one investigating officer opined
2
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that defendant had been manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 215:36). At the conclusion
of the preliminary hearing, the preliminary hearing court1 stayed its bindover decision
pending further review (R. 215:66-68).
On December 3, 1996, the preliminary hearing court orally announced its decision
to bind the case over on both charges (R. 215:69-70). Specifically, as to the charge of
operating a clandestine drug laboratory, the court ruled that:
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable
cause. Very limited probable cause, and very limited bindover
in this case. On Count 1, it's a first degree felony, Violation
of Clandestine Drug Lab Act. I find there is probable cause
only on the following elements to bind the case over for trial.
That the Defendant possessed supplies, laboratory supplies,
specifically iodine, with intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation. I'm finding that on the basis that he
knew that it was ongoing, and apparently knew that the iodine
would be used in that process. And therefore in a liberal
interpretation of that would be participating in that. And that
the lab operation was for the production of methamphetamine.
And that was the evidence in the case.
As far as the remaining elements, I don't think the State
can rely on any of the other elements. I'm not binding it over
on any of the others.2 And it's on that limited finding.
(R. 215:69-70).
1

In this case, the same district court judge acted as both preliminary hearing court
judge and trial court judge. However, for the sake of clarity, the two courts will be
referred to herein as separate entities.
2

The preliminary hearing court did not bindover on the element that the operation of
the laboratory occurred withinfive-hundredfeet of a residence, as charged in the information
(R. 215:62). The court apparently questioned the applicability of that particular element in
this instance (R. 215:61 -62). However, because that element was charged in the alternative,
this did not affect the bindover of the charge as a first degree felony.
3
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On February 5 and 6, 1997, defendant was tried on both charges. During the trial,
the trial court expressed some confusion over the elements underlying the bindover
(R. 184:210).

Specifically, the trial court was concerned that the docket entry

memorializing the preliminary hearing court's December 3, 1996, bindover decision did
not accurately reflect the court's oral announcement thereof (R. 184:212). That docket
entry stated:
DECISION: AS TO COUNT 1, COURT ORDERS DEF
BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL. COURT FINDS THERE IS A
LIMITED AMOUNT OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND
CASE OVER. COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE ON
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: 1) DEF POSSESSED
SUPPLIES (LABORATORY SUPPLIES, I.E. IODINE)
WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE LAB
OPERATION. 2) DEF KNEW IT WAS ONGOING, AND
NEW [sic] THE IODINE WOULD BE USED FOR THAT
PROCESS. COURT DOES NOT BIND CASE OVER ON
REMAINDER OF ELEMENTS AS TO COUNT 1. AS TO
COUNT II, COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
DEF
POSSESSED
THE
METHAMPHETAMINE. COURT WILL ORDER COUNT
II BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL ALSO.
The trial court recognized that deficiencies must exist in the docket entry, otherwise the
case could not have been bound over as a first degree felony (R. 184:214). The court
remedied this problem by referring to the recording of the oral bindover decision, in which
the preliminary hearing court found that the clandestine drug laboratory operation was for
the production of methamphetamine (R. 184:213, 223). The case proceeded as charged,
with the operating a clandestine drug laboratory charge being tried as a first degree felony.

4
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Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged on both counts
(R. 158-59).

Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate term of

five-years-to-life on the operating a clandestine drug laboratory charge and a concurrent
zero-to-five year term on the possession of methamphetamine charge (R. 186:10).
This appeal ensued (R. 179).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 3,1996, defendant operated a clandestine drug laboratory and possessed
methamphetamine. The following facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict. See State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350. 351 (Utah 1996).
Between 6:50 and 7:00 a.m. on August 3,1996, Officer Timothy Shelstead arrived
at defendant's home, having been dispatched to investigate a house fire that "had a
chemical smell to it" (R. 184:84; 87). As Officer Shelstead arrived, paramedics were
loading defendant's friend, Ronald Ray Olsen, into an ambulance that had previously
arrived on the scene (R. 184:85). Olsen suffered extreme burns throughout his body from
the house fire (R. 184:85). Olsen later died from his injuries (R. 185:142).
Officer Shelstead made contact with defendant and his wife, who identified
themselves as renters of the smoldering house and Olsen as a resident in their basement
(R. 184:85). Both defendant and his wife initially claimed to have no knowledge of what
had occurred; they stated that they were awakened by Olsen's screams and then discovered
that their home was on fire (R. 184:86).
5
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As Officer Shelstead approached the house, he overheard two firemen discussing
the discovery of numerous beakers and suspicious items in the basement (R. 184:87).
Concerned that a clandestine drug laboratory had been operating in the home and had
caused the fire, Officer Shelstead inquired of the defendant whether Olsen had been
operating a methamphetamine laboratory in the basement (R. 184:87). Defendant replied
that he had heard rumors that Olsen had been making methamphetamine (R. 184:87).
Defendant also admitted that he and his spouse both used drugs and that there was
methamphetamine in his kitchen (R. 184:88). Based on the evidence available to Officer
Shelstead, he read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him (R. 184:89).
Officer Shelstead then asked defendant whether he smelted anything in his home
that would indicate that Olsen had been cooking methamphetamine in the basement
(R. 184:91). Defendant replied that "you could have five police officers walk in the room
next to the room that basically someone is cooking meth in, if it was done right, with the
door shut, and you'd never smell it" (R. 184:91-92). Also, defendant reported that Olsen
had been cooking methamphetamine in the basement for three to four weeks (R. 184:95).
When Officer Shelstead inquired as to defendant's participation in the production of
methamphetamine, defendant admitted that he purchased iodine, a component of
methamphetamine, for Olsen (R. 184:95).
After obtaining a search warrant, Officer Shelstead entered defendant's bedroom
and found several items indicative of drug activity (R. 184:96). Officer Shelstead found
6
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a set of scales, some small plastic baggies containing a powdery substance which proved
to be methamphetamine, some pipes, beakers, cash, a shotgun, a pistol, notebooks
apparently chronicling drug transactions, a spiral notebook diagraming the proper
construction of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, and a locked box
(R. 184:96-97; 153; 185:25).

The locked box contained iodine crystals and red

phosphorus, both of which are methamphetamine precursors (R. 184:101). Defendant
later disclaimed ownership of the scales and the iodine (R. 184:99, 101).
Officers found evidence relating to the use and manufacture of drugs throughout
defendant's house. In the kitchen, they found an encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs
(R. 184:151). In the basement, officers found several items of glassware used in the
production of methamphetamine (R. 184:175-76), a small cooking stove (R. 184:177),
several chemical precursors to methamphetamine (R. 184:177-78; 183-186), protective
equipment (R. 184:184), and other evidence related to the operation of a clandestine drug
laboratory (R. 184:113;187-88).
At trial, defendant admitted to using methamphetamine, but denied having
purchased equipment or chemicals for Olsen to produce methamphetamine (R. 185:90,
103-04). Also, defendant claimed to have only heard rumors that Olsen was producing
methamphetamine in the basement, but did not know for sure that a clandestine drug
laboratory existed in his own house (R. 185:109-110).
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The jury found defendant guilty of both operating a clandestine drug laboratory and
possession of methamphetamine (R. 185:151).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting
to a jury instruction that allegedly conflicted with the preliminary hearing court's bindover
ruling. However, in so arguing, defendant misconstrues the bindover decision. The
preliminary hearing court properly bound defendant over under all of the elements
necessary to convict under Utah Code. Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 & -5 (1996), and the elements
that the court bound over for trial were properly reflected in the jury instructions.
Accordingly, defendant's conviction is entitled to affirmance on appeal.
ARGUMENT
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE BY
FAILING TO OBJECT TO A JURY INSTRUCTION
THAT PROPERLY REFLECTED THE PRELIMINARY
HEARING COURTS BINDOVER DECISION.
The analytical framework for determining whether a defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668
(1984). The complaining defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness." IcL. at 688. To do so is a heavy burden and a
defendant must overcome "'a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814
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(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689). "'This court will not secondguess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices appear in
retrospect. *" Strain. 885 P.2d at 814 (quoting State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,465 (Utah
App. 1993)).

Additionally, defendant must show that counsel's performance was

prejudicial by proffering sufficient evidence demonstrating "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Although this Court need not address both elements of the Strickland test if
defendant makes an insufficient showing as to one of them, Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d
516, 523 (Utah), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994), neither element is satisfied here.
First, counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness
because the jury instruction at issue, jury instruction no. 26, accurately reflected the
bindover decision of the preliminary hearing court. That instruction stated:
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of
Violation of Clandestine Drug Lab Act, a first degree felony,
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
all of the following elements of that crime:
1) That on or about August 3, 1996, said
defendant, John K. Provence;
2) knowingly or intentionally possessed
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation and
3) the intended clandestine laboratory operation
was for the production of methamphetamine base;
4) and said offense occurred in Weber County,
State of Utah.
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

If you believe that the evidence established each and all
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other
hand, if the evidence failed to establish one or more of said
elements, you should find the defendant not guilty.
(R. 156).
According to defendant, this instruction conflicted with the bindover decision as
reflected by a December 3, 1996, docket entry. Specifically, defendant avers that the
preliminary hearing court never bound defendant over as to the third element, that the
clandestine drug laboratory operation was for the production of methamphetamine base.
Aplee. Brief at 14, 15. The docket entry upon which defendant bases his argument reads:
DECISION: AS TO COUNT 1, COURT ORDERS DEF
BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL. COURT FINDS THERE IS A
LIMITED AMOUNT OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND
CASE OVER. COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE ON
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: 1) DEF POSSESSED
SUPPLIES (LABORATORY SUPPLIES, I.E. IODINE)
WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE LAB
OPERATION. 2) DEF KNEW IT WAS ONGOING, AND
NEW [sic] THE IODINE WOULD BE USED FOR THAT
PROCESS. COURT DOES NOT BIND CASE OVER ON
REMAINDER OF ELEMENTS AS TO COUNT 1. AS TO
COUNT II, COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
DEF
POSSESSED
THE
METHAMPHETAMINE. COURT WILL ORDER COUNT
II BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL ALSO.
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However, the record in this case clearly indicates that this docket entry is
inaccurate. In the transcript of the preliminary hearing court's oral announcement of its
bindover decision, the court found the following concerning the charge of operating a
clandestine drug laboratory:
I find there is probable cause only on the following elements
to bind the case over for trial. That the Defendant possessed
supplies, laboratory supplies, specifically iodine, with intent to
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. I'm finding that
on the basis that he knew that it was ongoing, and apparently
knew that the iodine would be used in that process. And
therefore in a liberal interpretation of that would be
participating in that. And that the lab operation was for the
production of methamphetamine. And that was the evidence
in the case.
(R. 215:69-70) (emphasis added).
At trial, the trial court initially experienced the same confusion that defendant
exhibits on appeal, displaying uncertainty as to the elements that were bound over for trial
(R. 184:213,223). However, after referring to the tape of the oral decision, the trial court
was sufficiently satisfied to permit the operating a clandestine drug laboratory charge to
be tried as a first degree felony. Furthermore, the elements set forth in the preliminary
hearing court's bindover decision were subsequently incorporated into jury instruction
no. 26.

11
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Because the jury instruction precisely stated the elements bound over for trial,
a failure to object to the instruction cannot fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for not raising meritless claims.
See State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993) (rejecting ineffectiveness of counsel
claims that are not only "unsupported by the record, but also [are] contradicted"); Cf State
v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988) (finding no ineffective assistance for not
requesting improper jury instructions).
Additionally, jury instruction no. 26 accurately reflects the elements of the first
degree felony of operating a clandestine drug laboratory; therefore, defendant cannot
establish prejudice as a result of trial counsel*s failure to object. Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37d-5 (1996) states:
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), or (e)3 is
guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the
following conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;

3

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1996) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or
intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;
12
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(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials
in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was created
a substantial risk to human health or safety or danger to the
environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take
place within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or
school;
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation involved
a person less than 18 years of age;
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any
amount of a specified controlled substance; or
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the
production of cocaine base or methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed
in Subsections (l)(a) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction of
the violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall not be granted
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be
suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of
offense.
Id. (emphasis added). The elements set forth in section 58-37d-5 were not only accurately
reflected in both the preliminary hearing court's bindover decision and jury instruction
no. 26, but these elements were also proven by the State at trial. Thus, defendant cannot
establish prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object to jury instruction no. 26.
Accordingly, defendant's ineffectiveness of counsel claim does not meet either prong of
the Strickland analysis.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Pl_ day of November, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

£Et

NO&MAN E. PLATE
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were mailed by first class mail this ^

day of November, 1998, to the following:

RANDINE SALERNO
WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASS'N
2568 Washington Blvd, Suite 102
Ogden, UT 84401
Counsel for Appellant
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SECOND JUDICIv

TRICT COURT OF WEBER COU-

STATE OF UTAH

0SSTR1CT COURT
WESSR COUNTY
AMENDED

ATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

iNFg^iog Rn 10 25
Attorney No

HN K.. PROVENCE

District No

96-1212F
961900776

Defendant.

O.T.N.

B -- 55/08/21

8032682

SEn •'•

* . ' .

• - • ( >

ate of Utah
unty of Weber

ss
Count I

The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the
ttplainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant on or about
ra day of August, 1996 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a
RST DEGREE FELONY, TO WIT:
DLATION OF CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT, 58-37d-5, U.C.A. (1953), AS
ENDED, AS FOLLOWS:
FENDANT POSSESSED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECUSSOR WITH
TENT TO ENGAGE IN A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERATION OR
SSESSED LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES WITH THE INTENT TO
SAGE IN A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERATION AND
ID LABORATORY OPERATION TOOK PLACE WITHIN 500 FEET OF A RESIDENCE
E INTENDED CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERATION WAS FOR THE
DDUCTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE.
is information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
SHELSTEAD
VANORDEN
ZIMMERMAN

Authorized for presentment and filing:
MARK R. DeCARIA,
IA,
County Attorney
2y
TT. S

ascribed in my presence this 06th da\

September, 1996
MAGISTRATE

ssented and filed this 06th day of September, 1996
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SECOND JUDICi;.- DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COIL.,,*, STATE OF UTAH
ATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

HN K. PROVENCE

Attorney No

Defendant
B -- 55/08/21
ate of Utah
unty of Weber

O.T.N.

96-1212F

8032682

ss

Count I
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the
mplainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant on or about
ra day of August, 1996 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a
COND DEGREE FLEONY, TO-WIT:
ODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 58-37-8, U.C.A., (1953) AS
ENDED, AS FOLLOWS:
ID DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY PRODUCED, MANUFACTURED,
SPENSED OR POSSESSED WITH INTENT TO PRODUCE, MANUFACTURE OR
SPENSE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, TO-WIT: METHAMPHETAMINE,
HEDULE II.

ds information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
SHELSTEAD
VANORDEN
ZIMMERMAN

Authorized for presentment and filing:
MARK R. DeCARIA,
County Attorney

d£y^
lbscribed in my presence this 05th day^af August

MUJMft
,1996

MAGISTRATE
resented and filed this 05th day of August
, 1996
CLERK

yViJv^w^_
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SECOND JUDICIA._ DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COD.. Y, STATE OF UTAH
'ATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

i

>•

Attorney No

>HN K. PROVENCE
Defendant.
)B -- 55/08/21
:ate of Utah
mnty of Weber

O.T.N.

96-1213F

8032682

ss.

Count II
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the
)mplainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant on or about
*ra day of August, 1996 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a

IIRD DEGREE FELONY, TO-WIT:
)SSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 58-37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953)
3 AMENDED, AS FOLLOWS:
\ID DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY POSSESSED OR USED A
5NTROLLED SUBSTANCE, TO-WIT: METHAMPHETAMINE, SCHEDULE II

lis information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses
. SHELSTEAD
. VANORDEN
. ZIMMERMAN
Authorized for presentment and filing:
MARK R. DeCARIA,
County Attorney

abscribed in my presence this 05th da
MAGISTRATE
resented and filed this 05th day of August
,/£996
CLERK f

\

mi
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ADDENDUM B
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INSTRUCTION NO. <r^f>
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Violation of Clandestine Drug Lab
Act, afirstdegree felony, you mustfindfromthe evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that crime:
1)

That on or about August 3, 1996, said defendant, John K. Provence;

2)
knowingly or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation and
3)
the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
methamphetamine base;
4)

and said offense occurred in Weber County, State of Utah.

If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other
hand, if the evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the
defendant not guilty.
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